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ublic-private partnerships (PPPs) are usually authorized by the legislature as an 
innovative method of public service delivery, and funds to support their operations 
come from taxation on business premises or special property assessment fees levied 
on property owners for different types of improvement activities and services within a 
geographic boundary. Under these partnerships government may bring private sector 
businesses including nonprofit organizations into the reinvention and management of 
projects, while safeguarding the public interest and ensuring efficient delivery of public 
services. The major goal of PPPs is to encourage employment, commerce, economic 
development, and public welfare in certain areas.  
During situations of fiscal crises, urban economic development scholars have argued that 
PPPs offer governments an opportunity to partner with private organizations in achieving 
public objectives (Ewoh, 2007; Koven & Lyons, 2003; Mitchell, 2001; Morgan, England & 
Pelissero, 2007).   In view of this argument, the purpose of this analysis is to examine the 
PPPs’ processes, financing, and promotion strategies in various projects as well as their 
impacts on sustainable economic development in Atlanta and Houston metropolitan areas of 
the United States.  An undergirding question to be answered in this analysis is why should 
any government entity engage in public-private partnerships? To answer this question, the 
P 
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paper starts with an overview of PPPs as an economic development tool. This is followed 
by an exploration of their governing structures, intergovernmental relations, and 
accountability issues as these relate to metropolitan governance. In addition, the paper 
concludes with recommendations on successful implementation mechanisms. 
 
An Overview of Public-Private Partnerships and Its Theoretical Framework 
In the United States, governments at the national, state, and local levels have partnered with 
private corporations and nonprofit organizations to plan, mobilize for public support, and 
pay for important social programs, and construction of mutually beneficial infrastructures.  
Why should any government entity engage in public-private collaborations? To answer this 
question, a historical brief analysis of PPPs is in order here. The PPPs predates the 
American Revolutionary war. In 1652, the Boston Water Works Company was the first 
private entity to supply drinking water to the United States citizens. In fact, before the 
United States independence, there has been a broad range of PPPs established to secure the 
nation from foreign invasion as private corporations developed different management 
mechanisms that were later used and further developed by the United States Department of 
Defense (Ewoh & Dillard, 2003). 
The literature has chronicled the proliferation of PPPs through business improvement 
districts (BIDs) in the United States and other nations within the last four decades. BIDs 
operate under different legal arrangements and are called different names in the United 
States, such as community improvement districts (CIDs), municipal management districts 
(MMDs), downtown improvement districts, self-help business improvement districts, 
special purpose districts, economic improvement districts, to name but a few. In Canada, 
they are referred to as business improvement areas, and are known as city improvement 
districts in South Africa, and generally called business improvement districts in the United 
Kingdom (Morcol & Zimmermann, 2008; Fraser, 2007).  
Conceptually, the formation of BIDs—also known as CIDs or MMDs—parallels the 
rational choice model, according to Morcol and his colleagues (2008, 4-5):   
Rational choice theories (public choice, institutional rational choice, polycentrism, 
and others) make the fundamental assumption that individuals are actors in 
economic and social life who make rational (utility maximizing) decisions, which in 
the end benefit all those who are involved. In the theoretical framework of rational 
choice, individual preferences are universal and predetermined. The general 
normative preference of rational choice theorists is for less external (governmental) 
intervention in the decisions of individual, and therefore smaller governmental units 
that are ‘closer’ to decisions makers. BIDs fit this definition of smaller and closer 
units. 
Despite the rational choice theorists’ perspective on government intervention, the opponents 
of small governments or shadow governments (e.g., Garreau, 1991, Heckathorn & Maser, 
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1987; McConnell, 1966; Sandel, 1996) argue that these units are not only undemocratic, in 
terms of governance, but they are potential causes of inter-district inequity because property 
owners in low-income neighborhoods may be excluded from receiving supplemental 
services due to their inability to pay extra taxes or fees required for the creation of a nested 
government. 
The proponents of small governments maintain that these types of governance have been 
found to be in consonance with the classic polycentric model of local government (see Baer 
& Marando, 2001; Parks & Oakerson, 1989; Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, 1961; Polanyi, 
1951). A polycentric urban area refers to an area with multiple centers, instead of a single 
center of monocentric city (McDonald & McMillen, 2011). Normatively, however, 
polycentricity is a public policy alternative that encourages balanced and multi-spatial types 
of urban networks that are beneficial from socioeconomic perspectives, both for the core 
areas and peripheries. As a theory, polycentrism is based on the principle of spatial 
organization of cities imbued with a functional division of labor, economic and institutional 
integration as well as political cooperation instead of oppression. Baer and Feiock (2005) 
contend that polycentric model of governance may be more beneficial in meeting service 
preferences than large diverse units of governments. As a result, their formation may 
formalize service-level disparities among residents and businesses within cities, and these 
disparities might allow services to be geared toward meeting the optimum need of citizens 
within the special districts in question (Baer & Feiock, 2005; Briffault, 1999).        
Without getting into the debate between the critics and supporters of the analytical 
polycentric concept, there are two important questions to be explored in this analysis. First, 
what motivates governments to create or encourage business improvement districts? 
Second, why are the governing structures or financing mechanisms under business 
improvement districts considered to be innovative? The answers to these questions will 
avail themselves below with special emphasis on CIDs in Atlanta metropolitan area of 
Georgia and MMDs in the Houston metro area of Texas, since these districts share the same 
characteristics with business improvement districts (BIDs).  
In terms of BIDs’ historic origin, the Bloor West Village BID was created in Toronto, 
Canada in 1970, as the first business improvement district. It was the idea of a Canadian 
jeweler, Alex Ling, who convinced government officials of the City of Toronto that local 
businesses should be empowered to take some control of their local area by improving it 
and paying for the improvements themselves to solve the problems of graffiti, litter and 
vandalism in the area.  Since the city government could not help due to its budgetary 
constraints, local businesses levied themselves and contributed money based on the size of 
their business to provide extra street lighting, smart street furniture and extra litter 
collection.  
Consequently, trade and profits increased significantly beyond the money initially spent. 
The concept accelerated rapidly across Canada, and in 1974, the first assessment-financed 
BID in the United States, known as the Downtown Development District in New Orleans, 
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was authorized by the Louisiana State Legislature. Since the 1970s, there has been a 
proliferation of BIDs, and the acceleration increased in the 1980s and 1990s. It is estimated 
that there are over 1,000 BIDs operating in the North America today, with budgets ranging 
from $3,000 to $15 million. In the United States, BIDs are located in 43 states and are most 
popular in the nation’s largest cities, including Chicago, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, 
New York City, Philadelphia, San Francisco, San Diego, Seattle, Tampa, and Washington, 
D.C. Moreover, BIDs are now available in some cities in other countries such as Jamaica, 
New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and a few European countries (Steel & 
Symes, 2005; Mitchell 2001; Hernandez & Jones, 2008).       
The growth of BIDs in the United States as alternative types of innovative organizations is 
usually associated with severe economic changes that have been mirrored in Western 
Europe.  For example, the decline of traditional industries such as steel and car 
manufacturing left cities such as Detroit and Pittsburgh in serious economic condition, thus 
leading to a decline in the local economic base, high levels of unemployment, a labor force 
without the knowledge, skills and abilities, coupled with a substantial number of blighted 
neighborhoods and inner city decay (Mitchell, 2001).  
Another motivation for the growth of BIDs is that it is backed by public choice arguments 
that some public services could be delivered more efficiently and effectively by private 
firms, and that public ownership was not necessary in some areas of service delivery in the 
United States and other nations. As a result, the shortfall in city governments’ revenue from 
the federal government compelled municipalities to embrace BIDs to generate additional 
funds for services (Morcol & Zimmermann, 2008; Briffault, 1999; Mallett, 1993). Services 
usually provided by BIDs include supplementary security, extra street cleaning or garbage 
collection, and the promotion or marketing of special events within the district boundaries. 
The job of local government is to legally establish a BID organization, with an enabling 
legislation from the state legislature, to use as it sees fit in enhancing overall service 
delivery.  BIDs are, as Houstoun (1997, 38) puts it, “a powerful combination of 
ingredients—business self-interest and vision, together with public financing unencumbered 
by urban politics.”  
There are other explanations for the proliferation of BIDs, at least in the United States, 
which are imbued in the American cultural and political factors that influenced the 
“enlightened self-interest” of business owners. For example, Monti’s (1999, 245) 
observation that “American towns and cities were founded as commercial enterprises” is 
key to understanding the history of business influence on municipal government in the 
United States. In a country committed to self-help and interest group formation, it is not 
surprising that citizens are likely to organize themselves when faced will common 
problems.  This is essentially obvious when economic interests are involved, as in the case 
of homeowners and their associations (McKenzie, 1994; Nelson, 2005), and other 
economically motivated situations involving commercial land and business owners.  Similar 
to homeowners who are interested in preserving and enhancing their property values, place-
based businesses have a mutually equal interest not only in promoting their commercial 
5
Ewoh: Public-Private Partnerships in Atlanta and Houston Metropolitan A
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2011
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN ATLANTA AND  
HOUSTON METROPOLITAN AREAS OF THE UNITED STATES 
  
 
   




interests, but in enhancing the profitability of their business locations (Logan & Molotch, 
1987).  BIDs formation must be conceptually explored in this context in the United States 
(Ewoh & Zimmermann, 2010).  
According to Ewoh and Zimmermann (2010), United States started as a unique confluence 
of capitalism and democracy, imbued in the concept of private property.  BIDs in general, 
and particularly community improvement districts (CIDs) in Atlanta, Georgia, as well as 
municipal management districts (MMDs) in Houston, Texas, are examples of the long-
standing American tradition of self-help and the close affiliation between political rights 
and property ownership.   
The CIDs of Georgia and MMDs of Texas reflect many of the general characteristics of 
BIDs (i.e., public-private partnerships); however they are also different due to the political 
culture, the changing economic conditions, and demographics of the states where they are 
located.  For example, whereas Georgia’s CIDs are constitutionally established local 
governments, Texas’ MMDs (and BIDs in many other states such California and New 
York) serve as a component of urban governance and administration.  In Georgia and 
Texas, residents are not allowed to join these types of public-private partnerships; whether 
they could form their own has not been examined at this stage. CIDs depend on the 
counties/cities to collect taxes since they are already in the business of doing this; it will not 
be efficient to do otherwise. Conversely, MMDs taxes are collected through the tax 
increment reinvestment zone—a form of tax increment financing. In the United States, 
government has always been driven by economic interest groups and business to influence 
public policy in their favor through interest group activism. Consequently, business entities 
have used the power of persuasion to influence their state legislatures in Georgia and Texas 
to authorize them to create their own hidden governments through CIDs and MMDs, 
respectively. Since the formation of public-private partnership tends to vary in terms of 
processes in Georgia and Texas, this analysis now turns to the discussion of CIDs and 
MMDs formation processes, financing and promotion strategies in Atlanta and Houston 
metropolitan areas. 
 
CIDs Formation Process, Governance, and Financing in Georgia 
There are thirteen community improvement districts (CIDs) in Georgia. These districts 
include urban—downtown and in-town—CIDs in metropolitan Atlanta such as Downtown, 
Midtown, and Buckhead.  Initially, Georgia CIDs were created in the suburbs to manage the 
explosive growth and the resulting traffic congestion in and around suburban shopping 
malls and business centers.  In view of this, suburban CIDs have different priorities and 
operate somewhat differently from their urban counterparts.   
The Cumberland CID was the first district created in 1988 as a public-private self-taxing 
entity in Atlanta’s northwest market known as Cumberland.  It is located at the junction of 
interstates 75 and 285 in Cobb County.  The CID includes the Cumberland Mall—Galleria 
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area, also called the “Platinum Triangle,” originally founded in 1973 and labeled “a classic 
of the Edge City genre” (Garreau, 1991, 172).  Since its creation, the district has leveraged 
$100 million in local assessment into projects worth billions of dollars that are either 
completed or under construction (Cumberland CID, 2010, 2). 
In terms of formation process, a few common legal procedures are required in the United 
States for the creation of business improvement districts (BIDs).  An enabling legislation is 
enacted by the state legislature.  This is followed by a petition from a certain, state-specified 
proportion of property owners in the proposed district to the local government.  The local 
government formally approves a resolution creating the district and appoints members of 
the board, which in some cases may be elected in adherence to statutory procedures 
established by the state legislature.  Both the local government and the new district draw up 
a cooperation agreement which delineates services to be provided by the BID. 
In Georgia, the process follows these general legal procedures although, instead of a single 
state-wide enabling law for BIDs as done in Texas or elsewhere, an individual enabling 
legislation is enacted for each local jurisdiction (county or city) in which the BID will be 
located, however there are minor variations between these laws.  The only important 
difference is that some of the jurisdictions have sunset provisions while others may not 
because of their enabling law.   
The Georgia constitution in Article 9, section 7, defines counties and municipal 
corporations, and provides a clause on CIDs.  It outlines two conditions for the creation of a 
CID such as a city/county resolution and the consent of a simple majority of the commercial 
property owners who must also represent at least 75 percent by value of all real property 
within the proposed district.  Once these conditions are satisfied, the district is ready for 
operation through a memorandum of agreement between the governing body of the local 
jurisdiction and the leaders of the proposed CID.  The local government’s governing 
authority adopts a resolution creating the district and a copy of the resolution is filed with 
the secretary of state and the Department of Community Affairs.  As soon as the board 
officials are elected, the state constitution mandates that a representative from the local 
government must be on the board, which must enter into a cooperation agreement with the 
county or city. 
The state constitution authorizes local governments (city or county) to approve or reject the 
creation of CIDs.  It is important to note here that only one CID has been rejected due to 
some local political disagreement. Although Georgia’s political culture makes it unlikely 
for a local government to reject the petition of 51 percent of property owners with 75 
percent of the property valuation in an apparently significant area of the local jurisdiction, it 
can happen.  The way this usually succeeds, however, is not difficult.  In order to meet the 
requirement of 75 percent of the property valuation in the planned district, the organizers of 
the proposed CID will first persuade the other largest property owners in the area.  With this 
large amount of property tax already committed in principle, it is not difficult to persuade 
the remaining number of property owners required to obtain the simple majority because of 
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the potential reduction in their tax liability for the prospective improvements in the district.  
For example, in the Cumberland CID, it only took seven property owners to cover the 
required 75 percent property valuation; and of the total of 160 property owners, they only 
had to persuade another 74 to achieve the needed majority of 81. 
Furthermore, there are property owners who may be unwilling to partake in the formation 
process. These are usually absentee owners, remote real estate trusts such as pension funds, 
and big-box stores such as Wal-Mart.  In some cases, business leaders seeking to organize 
the district may resort to some creative gerrymandering, because the properties must be 
contiguous.  For instance, during the Town Center CID formation process, there existed a 
small hole in the middle of the site of a Wal-Mart store but all the properties surrounding it 
are, of course, contiguous. CID organizers also tend to limit their districts to the confines of 
a single jurisdiction, one county or city. This is why, for example, the large Perimeter 
Center has two independent CIDs, one in Fulton County and the other in DeKalb County 
with the same Executive Director and staff members for both (collectively known as the 
Perimeter CIDs) to save money. 
The majority of Atlanta metropolitan CIDs are in mixed areas. Residents are ineligible to 
join CIDs because they are not assessed. Nonetheless, the potential problem that this may 
create as it pertains to the district’s land-use planning authority forces some districts to 
invite residents to any planning sessions and seek their feedback as done by Cumberland 
and Evermore CIDs. The wide array of functions that these districts have been 
constitutionally granted makes them virtually fully general-purpose governments.  The 
general purpose government nature of Georgia’s CIDs can be seen through the range of 
activities the state constitution allows them to implement such as follows: 
1. Street and road construction and maintenance, including curbs, sidewalks, street 
lights, and devises to control the flow of traffic on streets and roads; 
2. Parks and recreational areas and facilities; 
3. Storm water and sewage collection and disposal systems; 
4. Development, storage, treatment, purification, and distribution of water; 
5. Public transportation; 
6. Terminal and dock facilities and parking facilities; and 
7. Such other services and facilities as may be provided for by general law.   
(Georgia Constitution, Article 9, Section 7, paragraph 2). 
 
In terms of governance, each CID is governed by seven or nine member boards, six or eight 
of whom are elected by the CID constituents, with the chair appointed by the county.  For 
example, in the City of Atlanta, there is one appointee each for the mayor, the president of 
the city council, and the chair of the city’s finance committee.  In Cobb County, the 
8
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appointed chairs must be selected from the CIDs’ property owners and the elected board 
members must be property owners.  It is pertinent to note here that the election system is 
not exactly democratic, and is based on property ownership.  Of the six, three are elected by 
electors, noncontiguous owners of property within the CID, and three by equity electors, 
property owners who cast votes equal to each $1,000.00 value of all owned real property 
within the CID.  That is, each property owner votes once as an elector (one person—one 
vote) and as many times as permitted by the property value (one vote for each $1,000.00 
value of said property).  This process helps to allow those with the largest investment to 
have the largest influence (Ewoh & Zimmermann, 2010).   
Regarding financing mechanisms, the major source of revenue for BIDs is self-assessment 
among commercial property owners; which is the reason for their existence.  While Georgia 
CIDs use self-assessments as a main source of revenue, what significantly distinguishes 
them is their ability, as governmental entities, to leverage large amounts of public monies 
from the federal, state and local governments to fund projects in their districts in the form of 
grants. Other sources of funds include special assessment bonds for public use 
infrastructure and voluntary tax exempt donations from businesses.  In the famously 
business-friendly political culture of the state, governments are more than willing to partner 
with CIDs in essentially funding their desired projects.  In view of this, the case of 
Georgia’s CIDs surely reflects the blurring of the line between public and private sectors in 
the public policy process. 
Georgia CIDs leverage a substantial amount of funds from governments through direct 
investments and grants. For illustrative purpose, the Perimeter CID “has leveraged $18 
million in self-imposed business property taxes into $500 million in transportation 
improvements” (Lightsey, 2008, 47). Now celebrating its 22-year history, the Cumberland 
CID has collected more than $100 million from business owners to leverage billions of 
dollars from government projects that are either completed or under construction 
(Cumberland CID, 2010, 2). While there is no standard method of calculating leverage 
ratios (Morcol & Zimmermann, 2008), CIDs leverage their funds with federal and state 
monies at ratios up to 10 to 1, enabling the community leaders to pursue a project they 
value for the economic development of their districts.  
The issue of accountability as it relates to business improvement districts’ operations is 
always controversial.  In fact, the controversy depends solely on the autonomy given to 
these districts, which tends to vary from one jurisdiction to another. Some scholars (Morcol 
& Zimmermann, 2008; Briffault, 1999; Garodnick, 2000) maintain that since these districts 
are more autonomous in their operations beyond their enabling law, state and local 
governments may not easily hold them accountable in most situations. The reduction of the 
state and local governments’ authority over public-private partnerships such as these has a 
serious public policy implication. According to Daniel Garodnick (2000, 1756), the 
oversight issue “is a double-edged sword for BID advocates.  On the one hand, to serve a 
‘limited purpose,’ BIDs are forced to argue that they are directly accountable both to their 
constituencies and to public officials. On the other, BIDs are successful because of their 
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inherent flexibility and their ability to sidestep the city bureaucracy to accomplish goals.” 
The majority of CIDs in Atlanta metropolis are dominated by business leaders or their 
representatives, and they may act without democratic accountability. As discussed earlier, 
residents are not taxed or eligible to serve on the CID board.  
 
MMDs Formation Process, Governance, and Financing in Texas 
The process of business improvement district formation in Texas, known as municipal 
management district, is closely similar to what is obtainable in other jurisdictions nationally 
as earlier discussed. Each district is established by an act of the Texas State Legislature 
under the terms and provisions of Article III, Section 52 and Article XVI, Section 59 of the 
Texas Constitution, and is governed by Chapter 375, Local Government Code, and a special 
state enabling legislation. The primary purpose is to promote employment, commerce, 
economic development, and public welfare in the commercial areas of municipalities. In 
Houston, Texas, community based organizations can apply to create municipal management 
districts (MMDs) in their neighborhoods. In order to qualify, the neighborhood must be 
devoted to commercial development and business activity. MMDs can be created in two 
ways: a) through formal application to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality 
(TCEQ), and b) through a special state bill with the help of local state legislator. 
All the Houston 12 MMDs were established by a special legislation in the Texas Legislature 
which exempted them from meeting the TCEQ’s requirements, such as a petition (signed by 
50 property owners), a statement of purpose, a legal description (boundaries of proposed 
district), and a public hearing—for petitioner to provide notice to all property owners for 30 
days (City of Houston, 2009). 
   On governance, an MMD is administered by an elected board of directors and a 
strong board is required for it to be effective. The MMD board of directors usually consists 
of property and business owners, and elected as well as appointed government officials. The 
board is responsible for setting policies and overseeing operations under the management of 
a company. Board membership varies in size, typically from 7 to 30 directors, and meets 
either monthly or quarterly.  
Regarding funding, property taxation and bonds are two major approaches of funding 
municipal management districts in Texas. Every district operates under five-year service 
plans financed by assessments for both services and major capital improvements. Services 
and improvements funded through tax assessments, ad valorem taxes, or impact fees are 
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1. A district may levy assessments upon petition of the owners of property 
consisting of 50 percent or more of the assessed value, or 50 percent or 
more of the surface area of the property in the district requesting a 
service plan, which may be imposed on single-family residential 
property. 
2. A public hearing must be held before a district’s assessment is levied. 
3. A commercial property in a district may be taxed if it is approved by 
the district’s voters in an election.  
Moreover, the payment of all or a portion of all costs incurred in an improvement project or 
services, in some cases, is accomplished through the second method of funding, that is, 
through the issuance of bonds. These bonds must be payable from or secured by ad valorem 
taxes, assessments, impact fees, revenues, grants, gifts, contracts, leases, or any 
combination of these funding mechanisms. State law requires the bonds to be approved by 
the Texas Attorney General as well as the affected municipality. Although future levies 
must be approved by all the stakeholders, they must not be too high to keep total collection 
cost as low as possible within the constraints of satisfactory equity and economic impact. 
As long as there is an in-built process transparency, modern information management 
systems such as geographic information systems can be deployed to make good quality 
annual updates possible and equitable (Mikesell, 2007). 
In terms of accountability, unlike community improvement districts in Georgia, Texas’ 
municipal management districts are required to file annual reports with the Comptroller of 
Public Accounts. The Comptroller’s office already coordinates the development activities 
of the local governments, as a result, has the legal mandate to monitor MMDs’ spending to 
ensure not only the proper accountability of public funds, but that MMDs’ projects and 
services are designed to improve the welfare of the people in concert with the primary 
purpose of their creation. Local government authorities (both Harris County and the City of 
Houston) can hold MMDs within their jurisdictions accountable through their oversight 
function and by their presence on the MMDs’ boards.  
The issue of accountability as earlier discussed applies to MMDs’ operations as well.  Just 
like Georgia, the majority of Houston MMDs are dominated by business owners or their 
representatives, and in some instances, citizens within these districts worry about the 
privileged position of businesses in urban governance and administration (for a discussion 
on the position of business in policy making, see Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993). 
Nonetheless, it is expected that the introduction of citizen participation in the board 
membership would remedy some of these problems. Cordial collaborations between local 
governments and districts within their jurisdictions will allow both to understand their 
operations and institutional capacities so that they can achieve more through a win-win 
public policy situation due to their transparent partnerships. 
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PPPs’ Initiatives, Intergovernmental Relations, and Promotion Strategies 
This section takes a closer look at urban economic development and their promotion 
strategies through public-private partnerships in Atlanta and Houston metropolitan areas. 
While the community improvement districts (CIDs) in Georgia do not have to collaborate 
with one another, they usually compete for federal and state funds, and this competition has 
compelled them to engage in healthy partnerships.  In fact, district officials have come to 
appreciate the importance of large economies; that is, their alliance with other districts can 
show strength in numbers and offer them more clout with the state assembly.  This type of 
alliance yields much dividend when they take on projects that will benefit the entire 
metropolitan area, at no cost to the legislature because the districts attract their own 
revenues.  The utility of partnerships has been shown either through some completed or 
ongoing transportation projects as well as infrastructure improvements explored below.   
In Atlanta metropolitan area, for examples, the Perimeter Community Improvement 
Districts (PCIDs) in partnership with DeKalb County have completed a streetscape project 
along Perimeter Center Parkway. Part of this project includes bike lanes, wide sidewalks 
with brick pavers, shade trees, decorative crosswalks, pedestrian signals, street lights, 
decorative mast arms and pedestrian enhanced lighting throughout the corridor. It is 
important to note here that this project connects with the newly completed $34.9 million 
Perimeter Center Parkway Flyover Bridge creating a north/south bike connection within the 
PCIDs. The streetscape construction was done by Baldwin Paving Company at a winning 
bid of $7.2 million, and was collaboratively funded by the Atlanta Regional Commission’s 
Livable Centers Initiative Grant Program, Governor Sonny Perdue’s Fast Forward Georgia 
Regional Transportation Authority Bond Program, DeKalb County Government and the 
PCIDs’ self-tax for infrastructure improvements (Jackson, 2008). 
An ongoing road project awarded to Mathews Contracting Company on February 4, 2009 is 
designed to put a half-diamond interchange at Georgia 400 and Hammond Drive so that 
drivers can go northbound from Hammond onto Georgia 400 and southbound from GA 400 
onto Hammond. Part of the project includes replacing the bridge—making it higher and 
longer—so that Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) may, on the basis of a 
feasibility study, add more lanes to the highway underneath in the future. GA 400 is a toll 
road built by the state government a few years ago to accommodate the exceedingly rapid 
growth in the most desirable center of metro Atlanta’s “favored” (north Fulton County, 
Roswell, Alpharetta, etc.), which bisects the quarter that is delimited by I-75 on the 
Westside and I-85 on the Eastside. The major goal of the project is to relieve some of the 
congestion at GA 400 and I-285, one of the most congested chokepoints in Georgia. The 
project will cost $18 million, and PCIDs had committed $5 million, a crucial factor in its 
approval by the GDOT (Hart, 2009).  
The Cumberland CID was created in 1988 to reduce traffic congestion by addressing the 
need for access ramps at Akers Mill Road and Interstate 75. That goal was later broadened 
to include better mobility and easy access to all four quadrants of the Cumberland Galleria 
12
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area, divided by Interstates 75 and 285.  Cumberland CID developed a master road plan 
consisting of a five-mile Cumberland Boulevard loop road to enhance connectivity. 
Construction commenced on the first phase of the project in 1991, and five years later, work 
started on the $85 million Kennedy Interchange, a key component that provides direct 
access from Cumberland Galleria office parks to Interstate 75. The Cumberland Boulevard 
loop road was completed in 2003, 15 years later at a cost of $300 million. In 2009, drivers 
now have access to all parts of Galleria without using interstates or U.S. Highway 41 
(Cumberland CID, 2008, 6-7).      
Furthermore, Cumberland CID is completing its road and transit initiatives by advancing 
$41 million in streetscape and trail improvement (started in 2010) through a $17 million 
investment to improve pedestrian connections and the area’s aesthetics. This projects 
include decorative pavers at intersections, landscaping, widening sidewalks and street 
furniture such park benches—with help from federal and state revenues, area residents are 
beginning to discover a more sustainable transit-oriented development and livable 
community initiatives (Cumberland CID, 2010, 10). The Commuter Club initiated by the 
Cumberland CID leaders in 1996 continues to provide various cost-effective transportations 
for commuters in the area that improve area traffic, and reduce harmful pollutants. In 2010, 
it is estimated that about 1.5 million vehicle miles were removed from the roadway, 785 
tons of pollutants were eliminated and moore than 41,000 total clean commute logs were 
submitted (Cumberland CID, 2010, 7) 
In the Houston metropolitan area of Texas, for examples, the Uptown District, also known 
as the Harris County Municipal District No. 1, is located around Post Oak Boulevard and 
the Galleria, the largest and most prestigious shopping mall in the City of Houston. It 
operates with an annual budget of over $3 billion, under the supervision of a 12-member 
board of directors. Due to its role as a high-end fashion and hotel district, it is the Houston 
equivalent of San Francisco’s Union Square and Los Angeles’ Beverly Hills. Uptown 
District boundaries are well defined.  It is bounded by Woodway Drive to the north, the I-
610 (West Loop) to the east, U.S. Highway 59 to the south, and Chimney Rock Road to the 
west. Uptown is also known for its skyline, and is the Houston’s second largest business 
district, and the nation’s 17th largest—about the size of Denver and Seattle downtowns 
(Uptown, 2011a). 
The highest achievement of Uptown is the construction of the 899-foot-tall Philip Johnson 
designed landmark, the Williams Tower (known as the Transco Tower until 1999). At the 
time, it was believed to be the world’s tallest skyscraper outside of a central business 
district. It is also home to approximately 2,000 companies, ranging from small- to large-
sized commercial businesses, consisting of a variety of diverse industries. The area hosts 
approximately 200,000 office workers and shoppers daily and more than 22 million visitors 
from all over the world each year (Uptown Houston, 2011a).  
Another important achievement of the district is its traffic management program. In 2006, 
the district added a police officer to patrol the area during high-volume traffic hours seven 
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days a week. The officer is responsible for observing the traffic flow within the area and 
taking action (with a public safety vehicle equipped with extra gasoline and tools to assist 
commuters) when an incident impedes area mobility and accessibility. In fact, the 
completion of IH 610-West Loop reconstruction, from US 59-Southwest Freeway to IH 10-
Katy Freeway is a big plus to the area’s traffic management. A $235 million Uptown Local 
Street Improvement Program is being implemented to improve local accessibility (Uptown 
Houston, 2011b). 
Since ensuring continued economic success is one of the district’s goals, the Uptown 
District is leading a strategic effort to identify and secure opportunities to grow the area’s 
commercial base by building and maintaining partnerships with real estate brokers, 
developers, property managers as well as corporate tenants. These stakeholders are now 
using Uptown’s website as a resource and tool to market the area and, of course, to facilitate 
leasing, development as well as investment (Uptown Houston, 2011c).  
Also, the Houston Downtown Management District (HDMD)—known as Downtown 
District—boundaries are represented largely by the freeway ring around the City of 
Houston’s central business core that covers approximately 1,173 acres of downtown. It has 
access to tax-exempt financing, immunity from torts, as well as other benefits. HDMD is 
governed by a-30 member board of directors, as initially indicated in an earlier section, 
representing property owners, managers and tenants in downtown. Several city department 
heads serve in an ex-officio, non-voting capacity on the board. HDMD is staffed under 
contract with Central Houston, Inc., a professional management company, and began its 
revitalization efforts in the mid-1990s. As a result, HDMD was instrumental in facilitating 
various public and private projects that helped to transform downtown Houston for more 
than ten years now. The Downtown District started by setting important goals with 
improving the quality of life as an underlying theme. Significant projects completed by 
HDMD include: Texas Avenue Streetscape Improvements; area enhancements associated 
with Metro’s Downtown Transit Streets Improvements Project; and the City of Houston’s 
Cotswold 2000 Project (Central Houston Inc., 2011). 
A seven and half mile light rail line completed in January 2004 that connects the University 
of Houston Downtown, downtown, Midtown, the Museum District, Hermann Park, the 
Texas Medical Center and Reliant Park was opened. The HDMD partnered with the Main 
Street Market Square Redevelopment Authority to provide necessary enhancements of the 
rail line, which included sidewalks and pull outs, brick pavers, special streetlights, drinking 
fountains, additional landscaping, and street clock at the cost of $10 million.   The cost of 
the entire Metropolitan Transit Authority rail project was $324 million (Downtown District, 
2011).    
Also in 2004, the southeast section of downtown, generally bounded by Main Street to the 
west, Rusk to the north, US-59 to the east, and IH-45 to the south, pedestrian walkways 
were upgraded through the Southeast Quadrant Streetscapes Improvements Project, a joint 
effort between the City of Houston and HDMD.  Improvements completed in this area 
14
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include new street pavements, improved drainage, sidewalks, trees and landscaping, 
removal of overhead utilities, and traffic signal upgrades at a total cost of $8 million (the 
list of other projects either completed or ongoing are available online, see Downtown 
District, 2011).  Today, downtown Houston is booming as a result of a substantial number 
of public-private investment that allowed developers to spend over $4 billion in the mid-
1990s to transform downtown into a commercial city center. Beginning in 2007, over $3 
billion development activities are under implementation with over 30 projects including 
civic buildings, commercial office towers, residential and infrastructure (Central Houston 
Inc., 2008). While the downtown Houston has benefited from the renewed wave of 
investment in the area, the lesson learned here is that public and private partnership has 
helped to create a common set of principles and goals to ensure that development in the 
district is pedestrian-oriented and transit-supportive; thus creating a win-win situation that 
helps in attracting more interests in urban design and economic development practices that 
can be emulated by other districts. 
All the districts explored in this analysis have their own websites and real estate 
professionals make use of these outlets in reporting current information pertaining to the 
office activity in their geographic areas. The inventory of available office spaces are usually 
reviewed online by corporations planning on relocating either to Atlanta or Houston. Both 
CIDs and MMDs work collaboratively with other levels of government, and nonprofit 
organizations in their jurisdictions in accomplishing their missions.    
 
Conclusions 
Public-private partnerships through community improvement districts (CIDs) or municipal 
management districts (MMDs) are self-taxing and legally sanctioned self-help public-
private corporations created by the legislature to provide services to enhance the local 
business environment. As business improvement districts, CIDs and MMDs fulfill a variety 
of developmental functions: 1) They function as sustainers of existing development, 2) they 
take a promotional role by engaging in marketing efforts to consumers, and 3) they fulfill a 
development role by promoting economic growth and attracting new businesses within their 
jurisdictions. These functions provide answers to the undergirding question raised earlier in 
this analysis. That is, why should any government entity engage in public-private 
partnerships? Although some of the metropolitan Atlanta CIDs and Houston metro MMDs 
reviewed in this analysis have tried to fulfill these three functions, most do target a narrower 
set of activities as dictated by both the organizational features of either the CIDs or MMDs 
themselves, and the environmental context of their respective geographic areas.  
By creating a partnership among property owners, business, the community, and local 
government, both CIDs and MMDs represent a tool through which to enhance the visibility 
of a certain geographic area to conduct business. Whereas the vision of what CIDs and 
MMDs can do in Atlanta and the Houston area is promising, their capacity to function 
efficiently and effectively, as sustainers, promoters, or developers of an area must be 
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understood within the context of their organizational structures, stakeholders, and their 
respective political and socioeconomic conditions. For CIDs and MMDs to succeed as 
important development tools in urban or suburban areas, development officials must have a 
proper understanding of the stakeholders to ensure their adequate representation in terms of 
citizen participation. In fact, adequate citizen participation will help to counteract both the 
inter-district inequity and democratic concerns raised by opponents of the polycentric 
model of governance as discussed earlier.  
Additionally, local government officials must be able to work with community 
improvement districts or municipal management districts in their jurisdictions in identifying 
and analyzing the needs of all stakeholders according to local context, so that CIDs’ or 
MMDs’ board members can target resources to accomplish identified needs in a way 
consistent with efficiency and effectiveness in urban governance and administration. 
Although CIDs and MMDs are usually successful due to their flexibility, municipal 
governments must furnish an oversight mechanism to monitor their operations in order to 
assure proper accountability. 
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